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The turning of the millennium has predictably spurred fresh interest 
in reinterpreting the twentieth century as a whole. Recent years have 
witnessed a bountiful crop of academic surveys, mass-market picture books 
and television programs devoted to recalling the deeds and misdeeds of the 
last one hundred years. It then comes as no surprise that Germany often 
ﬁgures prominently in these new accounts. If nothing else, its responsibility
for World War I, World War II and the Holocaust assures its villainous 
presence in most every retrospective on offer. That Germany alone 
experienced all of the modern forms of government in one compressed 
century—from constitutional monarchy, democratic socialism, fascism, 
Western liberalism to Soviet-style communism—has also made it a favorite 
object lesson about the so-called Age of Extremes. Moreover, the enduring 
international inﬂuence of Weimar culture, feminism and the women’s
movement, social democracy, post-1945 economic recovery, West German 
liberalism, environmental politics and most recently paciﬁsm have also
occasioned serious reconsideration of the contemporary relevance of the 
twentieth-century German past. Little wonder that several commentators 
have gone so far as to christen the “short twentieth century” between 
1914 and 1989 as really the “German century,” to the extent that German 
history is commonly held as emblematic of Europe’s twentieth century 
more generally.1 
Acknowledging Germany’s central role in twentieth-century life 
has hardly made things easy for historians, however. In large measure the 
challenge has been to devise clear and compelling storylines to explain 
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the country’s dramatically changing political fortunes, its transformation 
from warfare to welfare state, as well as its complex historical legacy in 
remaking German identities, European politics and even global history. 
A good amount of the tension stems from the difﬁculty of conjoining
the ﬁrst half of the century with the second. For it is one thing to say
that Germany rests at the center of a ravaged century, having unleashed 
imperial wars of aggression, untold suffering and history’s worst crimes 
against humanity. But it is quite another to say that all of this was merely 
the bloody prehistory to a fundamentally different and comparatively 
benign story of post-Nazi development. What then is the relationship 
between the violence and will to power fueling Germany’s ﬁrst half of
the century with the experience of peace and (relative) plenty after? Is 
it simply an international relations morality tale of (again, relative) good 
conquering evil? Particularly unsettling for many is the prospect that one 
would be hard-pressed not to write twentieth-century German history with 
a happy ending. Even if few would subscribe to a Whiggish interpretation 
of German history, scholars are beginning to focus less on how Germany 
found its way into Nazism and World War II and more on how Germans 
got themselves out of them.2 To what extent each ﬂedgling republic
learned to become peaceful powers at the heart of a divided Europe is 
a growing research ﬁeld for historians of late. Not that the apparently
felicitous resolution of the once-nettlesome German Question is always 
easy to countenance: Niall Ferguson’s rather alarmist view of a Reuniﬁed
Germany that despite having lost two world wars has still managed to 
return as Europe’s dominant force (whereas Britain, having been on the 
winning side of both wars, has been unable to arrest political decline and 
waning international inﬂuence) is one recent instance pointing up the
anxieties associated with suddenly releasing the German past from its 
long-familiar Cold War conﬁnes.3 
All the same, some might counter that putting Germany at the center 
of the larger twentieth century is misleading and unjustiﬁed. On the one
hand, the United States and the Soviet Union were clearly more inﬂuen-
tial overall both in terms of geopolitical reach and ideological appeal. On 
the other, war, revolution and mass death—what Lenin rightly predicted 
would earmark the century—were hardly the privileged monopoly of 
Germans, or even Europeans for that matter. Viewed from a broader 
global perspective, Germany may not even be all that pivotal to what has 
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recently been called the “moral history of the twentieth century.”4 Moving 
beyond the ever-dominant Eurocentric framework for understanding the 
last century’s global violence, brutal population transfers, genocides and 
“radical evil” (one in which Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union 
continue to frame international historiography on these subjects) is no 
doubt a necessary step toward composing alternative, more global accounts 
of the “Age of Catastrophe.”5 Still, there is no getting around the fact 
that the two world wars and the Holocaust were hatched in Berlin. The 
importance of this can hardly be overestimated, not least because Germany 
became the focal point of twentieth-century notions of international crime 
and punishment. Indeed, the perceived novelty and sheer scale of Ger-
man misconduct in both world wars galvanized the war victors after each 
cease-ﬁre to expand and rewrite international criminal law accordingly.
The result is that Germany has been at the heart of transatlantic debates 
of retributive justice ever since World War I. This was obviously the case 
at Versailles and Nuremberg, but even to a signiﬁcant degree with the
Stasi trials following the collapse of the GDR. This article, then, addresses 
how ideas of Germany as modernity’s consummate “rogue state” have 
deeply colored twentieth-century views of international justice, exploring 
as well what is at stake in the recent collapse and even ironic reversal of 
this long-standing political perception. 
VERSAILLES AND ITS AFTERMATH
For the war victors and their representatives who arrived in Paris at 
the conclusion of the Great War, the peace convention augured a truly 
momentous opportunity. Whatever their differences, they all wanted to 
make good on the war’s gruesome death toll by drafting a peace plan that 
would assure that the fallen had not died in vain. For Wilson and the other 
statesmen, the treaty negotiations afforded a unique chance to devise a bold 
blueprint for a brave new world order, one that would “make the world 
safe for democracy.” The aim was to bring to an end once and for all the 
anarchy of international politics by means of a peace covenant in which 
the secrecy, cabinet-room intrigue and warmongering of the Old World 
would be replaced by the openness, cooperation and international spirit of 
the new. Not that international intervention in the name of civilization and 
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high-minded humanitarian ideals was particularly novel to the twentieth 
century. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, for instance, constitutional 
principles based on international codes of ethics, commitments to religious 
toleration and expanded civil liberties were promulgated within Europe’s 
“family of nations.”6 The 1856 Paris and 1878 Berlin treaties also provided 
for the rights and security of those peoples placed under the rule of a 
foreign sovereign.7 Not least, the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 
were milestones in the broader European effort to “humanize” military 
conduct through the establishment of so-called laws of war. Underlying 
all of these efforts was the ﬁrm and widespread belief that international
law could mitigate and deter international violence. World War I thus 
represented a crisis in the nineteenth-century system of international 
justice, and one that needed to be updated and fortiﬁed for a dangerous
twentieth-century world. 
But if the Paris Peace Conference was in part distinguished by the 
dream to build this international order on “enlightened” notions of crimes 
and punishments, there was little doubt that Germany was the nation on 
trial. This was accentuated by the fact that initial efforts to try non-German 
war criminals quickly collapsed in the face of postwar politics. Austrian-
Hungarian head of state Emperor Karl, for example, was deemed too far 
removed from events to be prosecuted, on the grounds that Austrian-Hun-
garian responsibility lay with the dead Franz-Josef; misdeeds committed 
by Austrian-Hungarian soldiers in turn were ignored altogether, largely 
as a result of both the absence of the aggrieved party from the peace 
conference (the new Soviet Union) and the widely shared apprehension 
that arraigning these ex-soldiers from the new successor states would be 
onerous and destabilizing;8 and the grossest breach of military ethics—the 
Turkish genocide of the Armenians—was not even seriously discussed 
by the peacemakers, since a state’s treatment of its own subjects was not 
actionable as a war crime according to the Hague conventions. The one 
instance in which the Allies pressed for war crimes trials outside Germany 
was the British campaign to try one hundred Turks for mistreating Brit-
ish prisoners of war under the auspices of the newly established League 
of Nations. Circumstances made this impossible, however. Not only was 
Turkey in the midst of a civil war; Greek soldiers who had committed ﬂa-
grant atrocities in their occupation of Smyrna in 1919 were not to be tried, 
thus raising objections of Allied double standards.9 These failures to mete 
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out retributive justice elsewhere only intensiﬁed attention on Germany as
a proving ground of Wilson’s new vision of international justice. In this 
sense, Otto Kirchheimer’s observation that “successor justice” is always 
both “retrospective and prospective” is particularly apt here, in that the 
Allied effort to lay bare the “roots of iniquity in the previous regime’s 
conduct” was inseparable from the desire to make Germany’s punishment 
“the cornerstone of the new order.”10 
Outrage toward Germany of course ran very strong from the very 
beginning of the war. Only a few weeks into the ﬁghting Raymond
Poincaré, president of the French Republic, spoke for many Allied 
leaders and peoples in accusing the Germans of being guilty of a “brutal 
and premeditated aggression which is an insolent deﬁance of the law of
nations.”11 However much the German delegation pinned its hopes for 
a just postwar settlement on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Poincaré’s views 
clearly won out at Versailles. At this point there is no need to rehearse 
the closed-door machinations among Clemenceau, Lloyd George and 
Wilson concerning Germany’s fate; nor need we dwell on the ways in 
which the conspicuous absence of Soviet and German delegates indirectly 
shaped deliberations. Certainly it has been argued many times that the 
infamous “war guilt” clause (Article 231) was really introduced to justify 
massive reparation demands. Nonetheless, the victors still had to make 
the case—the debate on what to do with Germany thus pivoted on what 
Germany had done. 
Crucial in this regard was the whole question of “German atrocities.” 
Obviously this was quite complicated, not least because all the belligerents 
habitually exaggerated enemy misbehavior for moral propaganda and 
heightened military engagement. That all sides desperately sought to 
present their war effort as fundamentally defensive made the question 
of atrocities all the more sensitive. For the war victors, discussion largely 
centered on Germany’s unlawful conduct of war. Calls to try Germany 
in court were expressed as early as 1915, as the British formally made 
war crimes trials part of its stated war aims. While such sentiments were 
downplayed during the war for the sake of protecting Allied soldiers in 
the ﬁeld, the punishment of war criminals was the ﬁrst item on the agenda
at the Paris Peace Conference.12 Among the litany of German “terrorist” 
infractions were the violation of Belgian neutrality; introduction of poison 
gas; unrestricted submarine warfare; mass rapes; the killing of civilians and 
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children during the occupation of Belgium and France; the deportation of 
tens of thousands of Belgian and French conscripted laborers to German 
factories; the launching of zeppelins over London, which killed over two 
hundred British citizens; as well as the sacking of Louvain and the shelling 
of Rheims Cathedral. As Britain’s ﬁrst historian of the peace conference
wrote in 1920:
The attitude taken up [by the Allies] is of great consequence, for it 
explains the severity of some terms of the Treaty. Germany, being 
responsible for the war and for the “savage and inhumane manner in 
which it was conducted,” had committed “the greatest crime against 
humanity and the freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself 
civilized, has ever consciously committed.”13
 French and British delegates called for the Kaiser’s extradition as a war 
criminal. The Allies’ domestic populations were even more bloodthirsty, 
as they clamored to try (and hang) Kaiser Wilhelm II for his violation 
of “international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” In fact, Lloyd 
George swept to victory in the 1918 election with his followers chanting 
“Hang the Kaiser!”14 While harboring little sympathy for the Kaiser or for 
the German people more generally,15 Wilson countered that putting the 
Kaiser in the dock was excessively vindictive and would contravene the 
principle of national self-determination. Besides, Wilson was of the opinion 
that trying the Kaiser might tip Germany toward communist revolution. 
“Had you rather have the Kaiser or the Bolsheviks?” was his curt reply to 
his British and French colleagues. Eventually a compromise was struck: 
the Americans conceded the introduction of Article 227 calling for the 
creation of a special international tribunal to try the Kaiser and to demand 
his extradition, though nothing was ever done in the way of enforcement. 
In this sense, Wilson and the American delegates succeeded in making 
sure that international justice did not trample the sovereign rights of the 
vanquished and its leaders.16 
But what about other accused German “war criminals?” The 
deﬁnition and understanding of “German atrocities” was instrumental in
setting the tone at Versailles. Despite the full index of German violations, 
the lion’s share of diplomatic attention was trained on German acts toward 
Belgian civilians during the assault on their western neighbors in the fall of 
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1914. Even if still somewhat disputed, there is incontrovertible evidence 
that German soldiers committed a host of atrocities against Belgians in the 
ﬁrst few months of the war. Chief among them was the claim that some
6,500 French and Belgian civilians were unjustiﬁably killed by German
soldiers in clear violation of the 1907 Hague Convention. Allied shock 
and anger toward Germany was not just a reaction to the number of 
civilians killed, but also to the manner in which German soldiers brutally 
mistreated them. Numerous eyewitnesses testiﬁed to the savaging of
women and children as well as the mutilation of Belgian priests. For 
many, the accounts of Germans cutting off the hands of Belgian partisan 
priests recalled well-known stories of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, 
which were widely disseminated in European newspapers in the decade or 
so before the outbreak of World War I. Part of the outrage thus derived 
from the perception that Germans had treated other Europeans as colonial 
subjects, driving home the point even more so about German uncivilized 
wartime behavior.17 The reports about brutal civilian killings not only lent 
gruesome rumors and wartime propaganda the aura of truth, but more 
signiﬁcantly, they strengthened the widespread Allied suspicion that the
German massacring of civilians was a key element of their prosecution of 
lawless “terrorist warfare.”18 
Not surprisingly, the Germans passionately defended themselves 
against such charges. First and foremost, they countered that Belgian 
civilians had forfeited their protective rights under the Hague laws of 
war on the grounds that they were in fact armed and aggressive ﬁghters.
Submarine warfare, so argued the German delegation, was the country’s 
desperate strategy to break the unjust Allied blockade; in the 1919 German 
White Book, Count Brockhoff-Rautzau even asserted that German civilians 
should be compensated for having “suffered immeasurable injury by the 
hunger blockade, a measure contrary to the laws of nations.”19 Moreover, 
they argued that the Allies were hardly innocent themselves in this regard, 
as brutal atrocities committed by French and Belgian soldiers against their 
German counterparts were meticulously recorded by German military 
authorities. Nor were these Allied infractions unique to the Great War, 
since it was well known that British soldiers had often been equally 
harsh toward guerrilla warriors during the Boer War, as were American 
soldiers toward Filipino irregular ﬁghters during the Spanish-American
War.20 Nonetheless, there was no denying that German soldiers had been 
Paul Betts
52
particularly brutal with Belgian civilians. Recent scholarship has shown 
that the 1914 confrontation with armed civilians invoked memories of the 
infamous franc-tireurs from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, when 
French civilians rose in arms to desperately defend their fallen patrie in a 
series of what today would be called guerrilla assaults against the advancing 
Prussians. The popular uprising of French citizens in the face of clear 
military defeat was feared not so much for any potential military threat 
as for its strong identiﬁcation with the dangerous (that is, anti-Prussian)
forces of republicanism, “people’s war” and revolution itself.21 German 
soldiers thus felt justiﬁed in 1871 and 1914 in defending themselves against
this “Reign of Terror” supposedly threatening them. Indeed, the specter 
of the Belgian Volkskrieg against German soldiers served as a powerful 
element of German military imagination both during and after the war. 
Tales of atrocities supposedly committed by Belgian civilians against 
German soldiers were woven into new narratives of German victimhood 
and defeat, as the “franc-tireur was thus added by way of the invasion to 
the spy, saboteur and Cossack as one of the signiﬁers of the enemy for
Germany.”22 So powerful were these memories that when Hitler’s troops 
occupied Belgium during World War II, soldiers were explicitly instructed 
to raze any and all Belgian monuments commemorating civilian victims 
of German atrocities.23 
So even if the Kaiser was left undisturbed in exile in Holland by vir-
tue of the “sovereignty immunity” of heads of state, Allied lawyers busied 
themselves with preparing their cases against other suspected German 
war criminals. The newly created “Commission on the Responsibility of 
the Authors of War and on the Enforcement of Penalties” recommended 
that necessary action should be taken against certain German nationals. 
Articles 228 and 229 stipulated that accused Germans be tried for “crimi-
nal acts” in “violation of the laws and customs of war.” But unlike Article 
227, which called for a special tribunal to try the Kaiser, these articles 
were to be enforced. Efforts to establish an international “high tribunal” 
quickly ran aground in the face of American resistance, however. Again, 
the Americans insisted that such a court was both unprecedented and an 
affront to national sovereignty, the effect of which would only further 
undermine the already shaky foundations of the Weimar Republic. This 
of course is precisely what happened, as Articles 227–229 (to say nothing 
of Article 230, which demanded that the German government furnish 
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“all documents and information” deemed “necessary to ensure the full 
knowledge of the incriminating acts”) calling for the Allied prosecution 
of the Kaiser and accused German soldiers met with extraordinary public 
outcry and condemnation;24 in fact, the Kapp Putsch, in which a cohort 
of ex-soldiers launched an unsuccessful coup against the country’s new 
social democratic government  in response to Allied demands to disband 
the paramilitary Freikorps, was also in no small measure fueled by the fear 
of extradition.25 The compromise solution was that Germans were to 
try their own nationals. There was a good deal of wrangling among the 
Allies about the number and composition of suspects to be tried; the ﬁrst
combined list included some 3,000 names, reﬂecting a “kind of rough
mathematical ratio of wartime suffering” by each country involved.26 Such 
an amount was quickly dismissed as unwieldy and unwise, given its likely 
reception in Germany. By the end of 1919 the Allies had handed German 
delegates dossiers on 854 suspected “war criminals” with instructions to 
press for prosecution; the list included such notables as Ludendorff, Hin-
denburg and Bethmann-Hollweg. After stiff German protest and delicate 
diplomatic negotiations, the Allies submitted a sample “abridged list” of 
forty-ﬁve Germans to be arraigned before the German Supreme Court in
Leipzig in 1921. The proceedings were packed with spectators, including 
journalists from some eighty newspapers worldwide. Yet the results were 
quite predictable under the circumstances. Of the forty-ﬁve submitted
cases, merely twelve were tried by the German court, and of these only 
six were convicted. Several of them even managed to escape with the help 
of prison guards who “were publicly congratulated for assisting them.”27 
Needless to say, the Allies were outraged. So incensed were the French 
and Belgians that they tried and convicted hundreds of accused Germans 
in absentia in their own national courts, and even attempted to use the 
war crimes issue to force compliance on reparations.28 
If nothing else, these deliberations help put the Treaty of Versailles in a 
slightly different light. It is common knowledge that the publication of the 
treaty incited a torrent of indignation across the German political spectrum, 
and that the Diktat was universally interpreted as crude victor’s justice 
imposed on a prostrate nation, thereafter becoming a festering wound 
in the country’s body politic. An extraordinary amount of political and 
academic energy on the part of German politicians, historians, publicists 
and even the Foreign Ofﬁce was devoted to refuting the war guilt clause in
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order to restore German innocence and national honor, as the unjust nature 
of the Versailles Treaty served as the focal point of political resentment 
and revanchist fantasies during the interwar period.29 Less well known, 
however, is that a good amount of this revisionist campaign aimed to 
exonerate the German soldier from charges of war crimes.30 A similar 
innocence campaign was conducted by the Auswärtiges Amt and especially 
the Reichswehrministerium to counter Allied war crimes accusations.31 
So whereas there is little question that the war and the treaty forged a 
distinctively German “culture of defeat” based in large measure on a new 
poisonous language of victimhood, aggrieved nationalism and redemptive 
honor, it is well to remember that Articles 227–230—and not simply 
231—generated a good amount of the sound and fury at the time.32 
But it is not as if Germany saw itself as simply the victim of a miscar-
ried international justice at Versailles. Indeed, it is all but forgotten that 
the Weimar Republic emerged as the champion of one key dimension of 
Wilsonian justice in the interwar years, namely minority rights in Europe. 
Such an attitude in many ways resulted from the signing of the ill-starred 
Polish Minority Treaty in June 1919 between newly established Poland 
and the Allies, followed by the conclusion of thirteen similar agreements 
with the new states of eastern Europe. Their centerpiece was the explicit 
pledge to protect the civil, religious and political liberties of their minori-
ties by devising what at the time was called a “new bill of rights” for them. 
The shocking revelations of Polish pogroms against Jewish minorities 
following independence stiffened Allied resolve to make the guarantee of 
minority civil rights the very precondition for international recognition 
of these new east European states. However, these new states denounced 
the treaties as an unjust affront to their newly won state sovereignty and 
as patently hypocritical, insofar as such minority guarantees did not apply 
to the Allied lands. No need at this stage to revisit the old story of the 
raised expectations and dashed hopes concerning ethnic minorities in 
interwar Europe; the relevant point is that Germany became the “spiritual 
center” of minority politics between the wars. That Germany had been a 
defeated country, subject to harsh treaty obligations, initially barred from 
the League of Nations and placed under Allied occupation, lent it new 
credibility in posing as the defender of the unprotected and aggrieved. 
As early as January 1919 the German Society for the Rights of Peoples 
(Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht) boldly recommended that all League mem-
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bers grant minorities proportionate parliamentary representation, while 
allowing them to use their native languages in school, worship and civil 
affairs.33 There were nationalist motivations at work too. In this case, the 
speciﬁc issue that galvanized Weimar politicians—in particular Chancel-
lor Stresemann—was Poland’s alleged “extermination policies” against 
German nationals—that is, the expropriation and expulsion of Germans 
from “the Corridor.”34 In response, Stresemann and his fellow politi-
cians repeatedly petitioned the League not only about more strenuous 
enforcement of German minority rights in eastern Europe, but insisted 
as well that a universal system of minority protection should be intro-
duced to end all of the glaring anomalies and double standards. In 1925 
Stresemann even organized the ﬁrst “European Minorities Congress” in
Geneva, where German and Jewish factions spearheaded the campaign for 
“cultural autonomy” for all Europe’s minorities. Even if the universaliza-
tion of minority rights was ultimately deemed “inconsistent” with treaty 
provisions, Stresemann had effectively exploited the issue to help unite 
the wounded Reich, cultivate western sympathies and create some room 
for diplomatic maneuver. 
Over the years commentators have tended to dismiss Germany’s 
seemingly high-minded humanitarian policies in general and Stresemann’s 
minority diplomacy in particular as nothing but subtle revisionism and even 
underhanded irredentism, not unlike Imperial Germany’s machinations in 
World War I to champion liberation movements in the British and French 
colonies as a means of undermining the Allied war effort.35 But in the 
end these efforts failed, as the Weimar Republic’s inability to incorporate 
the so-called Volksdeutsche into a Greater Germany through the League 
of Nations became a favorite whipping post in the right-wing media, 
eventually emboldening Hitler to withdraw Germany from the League of 
Nations in 1933 and to go about solving the minority problem by radically 
different means. Not long thereafter Wilson’s liberal internationalism was 
brutally trampled beneath German tanks, while Nazi jurists upheld that 
the “nation comes before humanity.”36 But just because we know the end 
of the story ought not obscure the fact that during the interwar years 
Germany assumed the unlikely role as the occasional upholder—and not 




By the time that Hitler had taken power in 1933, the whole tenor of the 
Versailles Diktat had drastically changed. The once-vociferous accusa-
tions about German singular responsibility and war crimes were slowly 
abandoned and even retracted by the international community; a grow-
ing number of politicians and publicists outside Germany now claimed 
that the German atrocities argument was largely the invention of Allied 
propaganda.37 Already by the Locarno Pact of 1925, which among other 
things authorized Germany’s admission to the League of Nations, the 
war crimes issue had lost much of its intensity. The new consensus of 
the late 1920s and early 1930s held that the Versailles Treaty—thanks 
in no small part to the strange marriage of German public relations and 
American revisionism—was an overly harsh “Carthaginian peace” (to cite 
J. M. Keynes’s famous phrase) that provided no hope either for Germany’s 
repayment or peaceful integration into postwar European politics. The 
ill-fated Allied policy of appeasement meant that Hitler was able to exploit 
the Wilsonian language of self-determination to press for his own “radical 
revisionism” in the Sudetenland and elsewhere on behalf of German ethnic 
minorities. A few months after Hitler took power, the prosecutor’s ofﬁce at
Leipzig formally ended all war crimes proceedings.38 Yet it was the failure 
to establish—and enforce—any workable system of international justice at 
Versailles that counted most. Hitler’s oft-cited brazen comment in 1939 
that “Who after all today speaks about the destruction of the Armenians?” 
pointed up the unpunishability of massive war atrocities in liberal inter-
national law and the court of public opinion. The disastrous miscarriage 
of justice in Leipzig further exposed the limitations of Allied jurisdiction, 
and undermined any real sense of justice served. None other than Albert 
Speer, following his conviction of war crimes in 1945, ruminated that “it 
would have encouraged a sense of responsibility on the part of leading 
political ﬁgures if after the First World War the Allies had actually held the
trials they had threatened for the Germans involved in the forced-labor 
program [in which Belgians were deported to work in German factories 
in 1916] of that era.”39 However we evaluate Speer’s view and with it 
the failure of Versailles, the treaty did create a new lexicon for the laws 
of war and international justice. And in this new normative legal world, 
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Germany became the measure of things—be it crimes or punishments, 
victims or avengers. 
For their part, the Nuremberg trials were both a continuation and 
departure from attempts to carry out retributive justice after World War 
I. In 1945, needless to say, the situation was quite different. This time the 
German Reich was fully broken and the country lay in ruins; there was no 
question as to its role in provoking the conﬂict, and hence no debate about
national responsibility; the Nazi government had committed a series of 
gruesome atrocities and gross violations of the “laws of war” (mass murder 
of unarmed civilians, ethnic genocide, etc.) that called for full and far-
reaching punishment. The trials against twenty-two selected representatives 
of the Nazi regime by the Allies between November 1945 and August 
1946 in Nuremberg thus took on heightened symbolic proportions far 
beyond the actual juridical proceedings. That the trials were carried out 
in Nuremberg itself, the city where the Third Reich’s infamous 1935 anti-
Semitic laws were ﬁrst promulgated, dramatized this symbolism even more
so. And just as in 1919 the desire to punish “crimes against humanity” 
(minority abuses and prisoner of war mistreatment) never moved beyond 
addressing speciﬁc German misdeeds, international justice in 1945 again
focused on Germany and Germans. Not that the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg was the only war crimes trial after World War II. 
Similar tribunals were set up by the Allies in Japan, as well as by various 
military and national courts in France, Italy, Austria, Holland, Belgium, 
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslavakia and China.40 Even so, it was clear that 
the Nuremberg trials set the precedent, as the drama and scope of these 
war crime proceedings assured its central place in international law and 
the popular imagination ever since. That many of the other war crimes 
trials, most obviously those that took place in Tokyo, were comparatively 
limited in scope (Emperor Hirohito and his cronies were exempted from 
standing trial for fear that the country would descend into “communism 
and chaos”) further highlighted the prototypical quality and relative success 
of the German trials.41 So again, the question about what to do with 
Germany was central to postwar reconstruction and European stability; 
its misdeeds were to be used as a cornerstone for erecting yet another new 
world order based on an expanded sense of international humanitarian 
law following the horrors of total war and genocide. 
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Of course many of Nuremberg’s basic principles were articulated 
well before the war was won. Declarations of retributive intent were 
made by Allied leaders as early as October 1941, at which time Roosevelt 
and Churchill (in part at the bidding of the Polish and Czech govern-
ment-in-exile in London)42 announced that “the punishment of [Nazi] 
crimes should now be counted as among the major aims of the war.”43 
The sanctity and protection of basic “human rights” was now elevated 
as part of the Allied crusade against the Nazi menace. In his 1941 State 
of the Union address, for example, Roosevelt deﬁned freedom as “the
supremacy of human rights everywhere” and that this in turn would form 
“a deﬁnite basis for a kind of world attainable in our time and generation.”
A year later, twenty-six countries signed the Declaration of the United 
Nations with the common pledge to “preserve human rights and justice 
in their own lands as well as in other lands.”44 Plainly this was an attempt 
to overcome the limitations of the failed Versailles Treaty. The Americans 
in particular believed that their refusal to join the League of Nations and 
later to take necessary actions against German aggression in the 1930s 
in no small way contributed to the humanitarian disaster of World War 
II.45 But however much Roosevelt held the League of Nations in low 
regard, refusing for example to include any reference to an international 
organization in the Atlantic Charter, he did give credence to Wilson’s 
concept of collective security. In fact, it was the combination of human 
rights, international normative justice and collective security—in which 
global developments would be monitored by the Four Policemen of the 
US, Britain, the USSR and China—that underlay Roosevelt’s vision of 
postwar order, and continued to shape perceptions long after his death. 
After all, the 1942 declaration clearly anticipated the founding of the 
United Nations, as well as the passing of the Anti-Genocide Convention 
and Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Indeed, the whole 
UN effort to set up “a progressive development of international law 
and its codiﬁcation” in turn was built on what were generally called the
“Nuremberg principles.”46 
 But this is not to say that the discovery of the full extent of Nazi 
“war crimes” and “crimes against humanity” in 1945 did not shake 
such high-minded wartime idealism. Already toward the end of the war, 
Roosevelt and Churchill made clear their common desire to execute Nazi 
leaders outright for their heinous misdeeds, believing that putting them 
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on trial would only repeat the juridical farce of what Henry Morgenthau 
called the Leipzig “ﬁasco.” Opinion polls conducted in the US, Britain
and France right after the war registered an overwhelming majority in 
favor of summary execution.47 But on this point, the Americans (above 
all, Secretary of War Henry Stimson) and certain key ﬁgures within the
British Foreign Ofﬁce convinced their allies about the virtues of avoiding
vengeful retribution, and that trying Nazi leaders was the most fair way to 
dispense lasting justice.48 Instead of simply executing the foe’s leaders as 
was conventionally done with captured enemies in the past, the presiding 
judges at Nuremberg strove to provide a full and fair judicial proceed-
ing as an expression of the very liberal principles for which the war was 
waged. The trials were then to serve as an antidote to the full abrogation 
of law and due process under the Third Reich, as well as the mockery 
of justice on display in Stalin’s show trials of the 1930s.49 As American 
presiding judge Robert Jackson put it: “That four great nations, ﬂushed
with victory and stung with injury, would stay the hand of vengeance and 
voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one 
of the most signiﬁcant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”50 For 
Jackson and the others, just war crimes trials were a ﬁtting end to a long
and barbaric war, one whose crushing of human rights would end with 
their retroactive restoration. 
 Like at Versailles, the Allies were faced with the problem of “German 
atrocities” and “war crimes.” But this time they did things differently. First, 
the Nuremberg trials maintained that international law applied equally 
to all individuals waging war, including heads of state. As opposed to the 
Paris Peace Treaty, the long-inviolable “sovereign immunity” of captured 
leaders was categorically denied. This time, too, the Allies wished to avoid 
the debacle of the 1921 Leipzig trials by putting German leaders and other 
accused German “war criminals” on trial themselves.51 As Justice Jackson 
remarked in his opening address to the tribunal, the Leipzig trials sadly 
illustrated the “futility” of leaving adjudication to the vanquished.52 Sec-
ondly, the Nuremberg trials declared aggression (that is, “crimes against 
peace”) as itself a violation of international law, and in so doing repudiated 
the sanctity of state sovereignty and “reasons of state.” In fact, Germany’s 
signature on the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War ban-
ning war “as an instrument of national policy” served as the ground of 
indictment of the Nazi leaders for “crimes against peace: namely, plan-
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ning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances.”53 Thirdly 
and perhaps most famously, the Nuremberg trials rejected the traditional 
notion that individuals could escape responsibility by arguing that they 
were merely executors of an immune state and its policies. Nuremberg put 
strict limits on the scope of many traditional defenses against war crimes, 
be they obeying orders, acts of state and/or military necessity. Rather, 
the trials introduced the novel concept of “crimes against humanity” to 
condemn those implicated in the planning and execution of mass death 
and genocide. It was an effort to make good on the famous Martens clause 
in the 1907 Hague Convention on land warfare, which called for the uni-
versal upholding of “the principles of the law of nations, as established by 
and prevailing among civilized nations, by the laws of humanity, and the 
demands of public conscience.”54 The defense and challenge of “the laws 
of humanity,” so maintained the Nuremberg judges, began and ended 
with individual responsibility. In Jackson’s memorable words: “The idea 
that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a ﬁction.
Crimes always are committed only by persons;” instead, “the very essence 
of the [1941 London] Charter is that individuals have international duties 
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the 
individual state … if the state in authorizing actions moves outside its 
competence in international law.”55 This was the reason that Jackson and 
the other judges rejected all notions of “collective guilt,” since they were 
interested in placing responsibility squarely on the shoulders of decision-
making individuals. 
 But what about the German reaction to the trials? It is well known 
that the German judiciary was skeptical and quite hostile toward applying 
the term “crimes against humanity” to Nazi offenses on the traditional 
legal grounds of nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without prior law). 
This was all the more important at the time, given that the postwar reha-
bilitation of the Rechtsstaat (rule of law) was considered by many as the 
most fundamental measure of denaziﬁcation in breaking free from the
Third Reich’s wanton disregard for law and constitutional justice. While 
West German judges grudgingly complied in prosecuting Nazi crimes 
against humanity according to the London Charter-inspired provisions 
of Allied Control Council Law No. 10, they eventually reverted to older 
German laws once the Allied constraints were lifted in the mid-1950s.56 
Germany, International Justice and the Twentieth Century
61
The desired cathartic effect of the trials on everyday citizens was also dif-
ﬁcult to discern, and already by the late 1940s Germans on both sides of
the Iron Curtain had grown tired of—and sometimes hostile toward—the 
prospect of endless future war crimes trials. Not that this sentiment was 
limited to divided Germany. Opinion polls conducted in the US, Britain 
and France at the time recorded collective fatigue and even boredom with 
the trials after a while; reactions across Eastern Europe were very similar.57 
More, the good intention of using the trials as a device to expose Ger-
man militarism and Nazi criminals was being increasingly compromised 
by Cold War concerns, as the compulsion to integrate each new German 
state into its respective Cold War orbit meant banishing the ghosts of the 
past for the sake of new political partnerships and ideological imperatives. 
The remilitarization and rearmament of both Germanys made such tri-
als increasingly awkward and unwelcome by the mid-1950s. The GDR’s 
ofﬁcial dismissal of the whole Nazi period—including the Holocaust—as
simply the ugly face of “fascist capitalism” and “western imperialism” 
buried these issues even further beneath the ﬂoorboards of a triumphant
“workers’ and peasants’ state.”58 The Third Reich’s Jewish victims there-
fore found no place or patrons in the newly minted collective memories 
of the war; in each new German state, the “murderers in our midst” had 
been removed from view, while select victims (the communist resisters in 
East Germany, the July 20 conspirators and White Rose martyrs in West 
Germany) were elevated into each respective post-Nazi pantheon. To be 
fair, this tendency was in some ways already apparent during the trials 
themselves, particularly in the sense that the presiding judges generally 
privileged documentary evidence over eyewitness accounts, and sum-
moned no camp survivors. The upshot, as Donald Bloxham recently put 
it, was that the tribunal “neglected to ensure that the victims were given 
the stage. In consequence, few non-Germans and no Jewish names, faces 
or stories were engraved on the collective consciousness.”59 From this 
perspective, the Nuremberg trials have been seen as actually blocking a 
full reckoning with Nazi crimes. 
 Still, one should not overlook the long-term positive effects of 
the trials. After all, the court proceedings were extensively publicized in 
newspapers and on radio across the occupation zones, often complete with 
remarkably detailed accounts of trial developments. Films devoted to the 
theme (such as the documentary Nürnberg und seine Lehren) were favor-
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ably reviewed and well frequented by East and West Germans alike through 
the late 1940s. Opinion polls conducted at the time reported considerable 
support for the trials, as a large majority of those asked found them fair and 
informative, even if they often questioned them on legal grounds.60 This 
was even more so in the western zones, as the trials were closely associated 
with the broader campaign to “reeducate” Germans about the failings 
of the Nazi past and the virtues of an alternative liberal future. As such 
the trials served as a veritable schoolroom for the fallen nation, in that it 
was during the proceedings when most Germans ﬁrst learned about the
details and faces behind Nazi war atrocities.61 No less signiﬁcant is that
the trials were also decisive in convincing many Germans that the Nazi 
reign of terror was completely dead, insofar as law, constitutionalism and 
the restored Rechtsstaat were the hallmarks of a post-Nazi social order. 
Naturally this was much more evident in West Germany’s constitutional 
development.62 The public outrage generated by the government’s rough 
handling of the press in the famed 1962 Spiegel affair—in which West 
German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss ordered the seizure of ﬁles
held by the left-liberal magazine Der Spiegel on the grounds that the news 
weekly was about to compromise state defense secrets—is a good case in 
point.  While clearly not a direct outgrowth of the trials, the scandal—and 
press victory—nonetheless was a key instance in upholding the centrality of 
civil liberty, free speech and the constitutional principle that the state itself 
was not above the law.  In this regard, the trials seemed to have produced 
the opposite effect of the 1945 Allied initiative forcibly to parade Germans 
past piles of slaughtered civilians and desecrated corpses so as to make 
them face up to Nazi crimes, which tended to provoke more revulsion 
and anger than remorse and contrition.63 That the Nuremberg trials were 
followed by a series of other war crimes trials in East and West Germany 
in the 1950s and 1960s—as well as abroad—indirectly conﬁrms the per-
ceived value of trying to confront the country’s brown past through the 
newly established court systems. To be sure, these trials remained delicate 
matters. Adenauer’s material restitution with Israel (Wiedergutmachung), 
for example, is often seen as shrewd statecraft to bring the trials to a close 
in the name of collective healing and national unity.64 Still, the Allies’ 
didactic aim of showing these defeated peoples the beneﬁts of due process
and punishing Nazi criminals in the name of political accountability was 
incorporated to some extent by each successor German state. 
Germany, International Justice and the Twentieth Century
63
But even if the language of human rights found little resonance in 
German war crimes trials, it was commonly invoked for other purposes. 
Not surprisingly this took on feverish tones with the intensiﬁcation of the
Cold War, as the rhetoric of human rights and “crimes against humanity” 
was often exploited by each German republic to criticize the other. West 
German ofﬁcials, for example, never tired of accusing the East German
state of human rights violations against its citizens, declaring that the 
Soviet treatment of German POWs “deserves its own Nuremberg.”65 
The GDR responded in kind with counteraccusations about the criminal 
bombing of Dresden by “Anglo-American gangsters in the skies,” as well 
as repeatedly asserting that the West German state was scandalously gov-
erned by unpunished “war and Nazi criminals.”66 But such language was 
also applied more widely. During the 1950s, for example, various West 
German intellectuals, church leaders and political activists often invoked 
the language of Nuremberg and even Wilsonianism (most notably, national 
self-determination) to support decolonization and the national liberation 
movements in the British and French empires. The 1945 creation of the 
West German International League for Human Rights (Internationale 
Liga für Menschenrechte) and the eventual establishment of a West German 
chapter of Amnesty International were important in this regard, echoes 
of which could be found as well among East German church groups.67 
These trends intensiﬁed in the 1960s, as West German youth in particular
increasingly turned this Nuremberg language of crimes against humanity 
against the Americans, particularly in regard to the civil rights movement 
in the US South and the Vietnam War. Such rhetoric also ﬂourished in the
peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and enjoyed perhaps its most 
dramatic expression in the Green Party’s staging of a “war crimes” trial 
in Nuremberg at the height of the US–USSR arms race during the early 
1980s, with the aim of drawing attention to worrisome American nuclear 
buildup.68 Now, whether or not the legacy of Nuremberg simply reinforced 
a “dormant legal consciousness” among (West) Germans is naturally 
open to debate.69 What postwar developments make clear, however, is 
that West Germans—and on occasion East Germans as well—were not 
shy in employing the language of war crimes trials to criticize its original 
authors and crusaders. 
 But this too was a problem built into the very foundation of the 
London Charter and the Nuremberg trials. Over the years it has been 
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commonplace to portray the trials as a superior version of international 
justice to its much-maligned forerunner at Versailles, particularly in light 
of the preeminent role assigned to individual responsibility and human 
rights in 1945. In part this had to do with Nuremberg’s insistence on 
enlarging the rights and protections of civilians, not least because prior 
war conventions only covered soldiers, sailors and the medical personnel 
looking after them. Unprotected civilians were now given center stage, 
since they had become the very objects of terror and war policy in World 
War II.70 Nevertheless, it is well to remember that the new focus on human 
rights was also a ruse to sidestep Versailles’ thorny issue of minority rights. 
At ﬁrst glance it seems easy to surmise why minority rights as such did not
survive 1945. The Nazi experience—and in particular Hitler’s perversion 
of Stresemann’s minority diplomacy—rendered the defenders of minori-
ties “forever suspect.”71 Less well known, though, is that the death of 
minority rights in 1945 was equally linked to the objections ﬁrst raised by
the new states of eastern Europe to the proposed 1919 Minorities Trea-
ties, namely that the demanded principles were not being applied in like 
fashion to the war victors themselves. The reason lay in the Great Pow-
ers’ own internal political situation in 1945. Britain and France still had 
colonies in which many people did not enjoy equal legal standing before 
the law. Neither did the United States wish to champion the cause, as a 
large segment of its own population was subjected to a crippling assort-
ment of discriminatory Jim Crow laws and segregationist social policies. 
In the USSR, millions were still laboring away without rights and due 
process in the Soviet gulags. The new celebration of individual human 
rights thus came at a price. As Mark Mazower observed: “Behind the 
smokescreen of the rights of the individual, in other words, the corpse of 
the League’s minorities policy could be safely buried.”72 The collapse of 
minority rights had disastrous consequences, as the Allies gave qualiﬁed
consent to the forced expulsion (according to the Potsdam Accord, it was 
to be conducted in a “humane and orderly manner”) of some ten to twelve 
million ethnic Germans westward by Poles and Czechs at the end of war.73 
But it was not as if these vaunted human rights were given any real legal 
safeguard either. Just as the impassioned efforts by the African-American 
intellectual W. E. B. Dubois and the Japanese delegates to introduce an 
article in the Treaty of Versailles proclaiming the racial equality of all global 
citizens were rejected as inappropriate, so too the Great Powers in 1945 
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formalized no notion of equality or enforcement of human rights in the 
UN covenant. In fact, an estimated fourteen million civilians have died 
in war-related deaths since Nuremberg,74 and it was not until the Serbian 
“ethnic cleansing” campaign against their Bosnian neighbors during the 
early 1990s that enforcement of these principles was ﬁnally authorized.
But in the intervening forty years, as Geoffrey Robertson points out, the 
UN Charter on human rights was severely circumscribed, for its “duty 
was to promote human rights, not to guarantee them as a matter of law 
for all citizens. This vagueness was quite deliberate: no Great Power was 
prepared in 1945 to be bound by international law in respect of the treat-
ment of its own subjects.”75
 Over the decades West and East Germans alike challenged this logic, 
and often pressed for the full application of these hallowed principles. That 
Germany was no longer an empire with colonies, and was not brokering 
international “spheres of inﬂuence” (indeed, it was one itself) cleared the
way for its open and full-throated critique. Naturally, the discussion was 
much more frank in West Germany, as the GDR’s criticism of the West’s 
selective understanding of human rights abuses obviously found no corre-
sponding objections to the Soviet Union’s own violations in the East. But 
it is wrong to assume that Germans invoked this language only in response 
to distant international developments. West Germans, for instance, often 
referred to the Atlantic Charter and notions of international justice in 
questioning Allied occupation policy, be it about severe food rationing or 
the dismantling of what remained of Germany’s industrial infrastructure.76 
Perhaps the most revealing case is the sound and fury surrounding the 
expulsion and refugee crisis in the wake of the 1945 ceaseﬁre. Indeed,
lost German territories in Eastern Europe furnished West German politi-
cians across the political spectrum with a pretext to challenge what they 
saw as the hypocrisy of Allied morality, sometimes going so far as to say 
that the brutal expulsion of ethnic Germans was no less a crime against 
humanity than Nazi war crimes. Leaders of the expellee organizations 
were quick to exploit the new lexicon of rights, insisting that what they 
called Heimatrecht (the right to one’s homeland) was itself a “God-given, 
basic human right.” They also justiﬁed their revisionist territorial claims
by invoking the older Wilsonian concept of “self-determination,” which 
was being widely employed by underdeveloped countries at the time as 
part of their own ﬁght for freedom and sovereignty. Given the expellees’
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political presence and electoral power, all three West German parties paid 
a good amount of lip service to their cause, publicly calling for the return 
of 1937 borders and in effect forestalling any real Ostpolitik until the early 
1970s.77 If nothing else, this shows that Stresemann’s “minority politics” 
were not completely a dead letter after 1945. While it is true that (West) 
Germany never recouped its interwar role as “spiritual center” of minority 
policies after 1945, prominent political voices did turn the language of 
international justice propagated by the Allies against the Allies in advanc-
ing claims of possible redress and repatriation.78 In this sense, human 
rights was used by both West and East Germans at times to underscore 
the moral legitimacy of their national polity as the defender of aggrieved 
peoples elsewhere—including members of their own imagined ethnic 
communities abroad—and post-Nazi humanitarian ideals.
CONFRONTING THE STASI PAST 
But if Germany rested at the heart of discussions of international justice 
after both world wars, it was so again after the Cold War. This could be 
seen above all in the post-1989 efforts to come to terms with the East 
German past, speciﬁcally the notorious Stasi legacy. East Germany of
course was hardly alone in this effort to cleanse its past after the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe. Poland and Czechoslovakia, to name 
the two most famous, were engaged in similar ventures. So-called truth 
commissions were also being set up all over the world in the 1990s as a new 
political means of confronting unsavory pasts.79 Yet the German version 
was unique in important ways. Much of this had to do with the sudden 
disappearance of the GDR state tout court, with the result that the legal 
project to confront the East German past took place not only within a new 
institutional framework, but also in a “new country, with new boundaries 
and a signiﬁcantly changed population.”80 Unlike elsewhere, postcom-
munist institutions did not need to be built from scratch there; on the 
contrary, West German institutions, personnel and constitutional rules were 
ready-made to pursue retributive justice and “decommunization.”81 The 
presence of a wealthy West German state assured that adequate ﬁnancial
means would be devoted to the cause of political cleansing from the very 
beginning. The uniqueness of Germany’s situation was also a result of the 
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fact that it was the country with the “greatest experience in addressing, and 
debating the proper way to address, the crimes of the recent past.”82 For 
all of these reasons, Germany’s effort to come to terms with its past was 
therefore often described as the most rigorous in the former communist 
bloc, taking on “an almost religious devotion to thoroughness that was 
unmatched by any other country at the time.”83
Resorting to law to overcome the worst aspects of the GDR dicta-
torship already found expression a few months before reuniﬁcation. By
the end of August 1990, the German Uniﬁcation Treaty called for the
dismissal of former GDR ofﬁcials or administrators who had unduly col-
laborated with the Stasi or had committed human rights violations on the 
grounds of their “unsuitability” for public service. In September 1991 
the Bundestag created the Central Investigative Ofﬁce for Governmental
and Uniﬁcation Crimes (ZERV), which was charged with overcoming the
GDR’s past through criminal law. To help with the investigations, and in 
response to popular demand not to have the Stasi records destroyed, the 
Bundestag soon thereafter passed the Law on the Documents of the State 
Security Service of the Former GDR (Stasi Unterlagen-Gesetz), which 
placed the Stasi records under the control of a new, nonpartisan document 
center headed by Joachim Gauck, a Protestant pastor from Rostock and 
former East German civil rights activist. The so-called Gauck Authority 
thus provided private citizens access to Stasi ﬁles as a step toward openness
and democracy, while at the same time investigating claims of individual 
infringements based on archival records. In the ﬁrst few years the agen-
cies were remarkably busy conducting purges, investigations and trials. 
By 1993 there were some 50,000 preliminary investigations, and nearly 
200 convictions. The trials ranged from border guards, mid-level ofﬁcials,
military generals, spies and secret police ofﬁcers.84 As part of the task force 
to confront the Stasi past, the federal government set up another special 
investigative body two years later, called the Enquete Commission, whose 
remit was to investigate “the history and consequences of the socialist 
dictatorship in Germany,” and to help lay bare the totalitarian netherworld 
of Socialist Unity Party (SED) administration, all of which was designed 
to break the cycle of illiberalism in East Germany. As commission director 
and former East German dissident pastor and civil rights activist Rainer 
Eppelmann put it, the agency was to aid in the wider attempt “to change 
our laws, issue new decrees, and possibly correct our behavior so that we 
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will not again ﬁnd ourselves in the position of the ignorant child who, for
the third time, touches the hot oven door and burns its ﬁngers anew.”85 
To this end the commission oversaw a whole host of initiatives (open 
forums on the Stasi, televised discussions, museum exhibits, academic 
conferences, etc.) aimed to expose additional dark elements of the past 
and to help ease the transition to democracy.86 
Yet this did not prove easy. The scale of material alone was daunting. 
The Stasi employed a full-time staff of some 90,000, while making use 
of some 170,000 so-called “unofﬁcial collaborators.” In all there were 
180–200 kilometers of shelved ﬁles, which included dossiers on some
six million citizens. (By contrast, the Gestapo employed no more than 
3,000 regular ofﬁcers, and perhaps as many as 10,000 total informants.)87 
Further complicating things was the question of responsibility. For if the 
worst abuses occurred during the early Stalinist years when the GDR was 
most directly under the thumb of the Soviet Union, then who was actually 
responsible for abuses? Similarly, the GDR in theory afﬁrmed democratic
values, in clear contrast to the Third Reich. As Erich Honecker deﬁantly
remarked in the early days of his planned trial, 
there were no concentration camps in the GDR, no gas chambers, 
no political executions, no Volksgerichtshof [referring to the Third 
Reich’s notorious People’s Court], no Gestapo, no SS. The GDR did 
not launch a war or commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
The GDR was a consistently anti-fascist state, whose dedication to 
peace brought it international prestige.88 
Not least, some of the indictments seemed ungrounded and vindictive, 
given that the state accused of wrongdoing had been formally recognized 
by the authorities now judging the criminal nature of its actions.89 
But it was the connection to Nuremberg that was the most relevant to 
the prosecutors and public alike. In some ways the implosion of East Ger-
many in 1989 was akin to 1945. In each case, the state had disintegrated, 
and representatives from the defunct regime were being put on trial for 
past misdeeds. Not that East Germans were inexperienced in meting out 
retributive justice. In the 1950 Waldheim trials, for example, the newly 
established East German government handed down some 4,000 convic-
tions for loosely deﬁned Nazi crimes ranging from NSDAP membership
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to Wehrmacht service.90 Even so, the dissolution of the GDR meant that 
its state institutions, court system and legal traditions played virtually no 
role in shaping the proceedings. And as in 1945, foreigners were placed 
in positions of judge and jury. While it is true that East Germans chaired 
key commissions, the West German state came to serve as “the functional 
equivalent to post–World War II occupational regimes.”91 This is largely 
why the investigations had a hard time shaking the widespread feeling that 
they were really dressed-up “victor’s justice,” just another installment in 
the more general “Kohl-onization” of East German state and society.92 
Activist and writer Jürgen Fuchs spoke for many when he conceded in a 
1992 interview that “if we do not solve this problem in a deﬁnite way,
it will haunt us as Nazism did. We did not denazify ourselves, and this 
weighed heavily on us for years.”93 Gauck himself drew the connection 
when he remarked: “We in East Germany did not want to take leave of a 
dictatorship for the second time with the implicit motto: ‘keep smiling,’ 
but believed that with knowledge, rumination and even sadness, we could 
succeed in becoming a democratic land.”94
The legacy of Nuremberg could be seen in other ways as well. Par-
ticularly relevant here is that the accused Germans were being tried for 
violations of human rights and Nuremberg-inspired international law. 
Indeed, the GDR’s signature on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which 
pledged the country to recognize and honor international human rights, 
served as the pretext in making the trials possible in the ﬁrst place. Besides,
the GDR constitution had expressly endorsed “recognized norms of 
international law,” in violation of which no legal order could be given.95 
Once the Wall was breached, these Nuremberg principles acted as the 
focal point for rallying new civil rights groups to pursue justice after 
1990.96 In this sense, the Nuremberg legacy of globalized human rights 
very much shaped the justice proceedings in East Germany. And just as 
German peace covenants (1648, 1815, 1919 and 1945) were never strictly 
internal German affairs, incorporating as they did the “claims of power-
ful outsiders,”97 the model of justice in the 1990s was not homegrown. 
But neither was it harshly imposed from outside, however much it may 
have seemed to many East Germans. German reuniﬁcation many have
been an internationally negotiated process (i.e. the 2 + 4 Treaty, which 
combined the two principal German polities, plus the US, Great Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union), but its post-1989 justice procedures have 
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been an all-German affair. For Gauck and the others, this national drama 
thus went well beyond simply passing sentences and setting the record 
straight. At stake was nothing less than the desire to reconcile trust and 
the state, German democracy and international justice. 
That said, many East Germans were very dissatisﬁed with the trials.
For one thing, many felt that they should have been permitted to manage 
their own affairs. Dissident Jens Reich complained, “this is our dirty laundry 
and our mess, and it is up to us to clean it up.”98 Others charged that 
the trials were wrong-headed and doomed from the start, if for no other 
reason that circumstances under which the documentary evidence was 
collected were rarely addressed. Nowhere was this more apparent than in 
the high-proﬁle trials of East German border guards, who were being tried
as much for what they hadn’t done as for what they had. Accusations that 
they were guilty of human rights violations and moral failings for obeying 
“shoot to kill” orders seemed to many to be grossly inappropriate and 
unfair.99 Still others argued that the Gauck Commission failed miserably 
to carry out its main mission. One study concluded that a majority of 
interviewed “Gauck victims” saw no real difference between the law and 
victor’s justice.100 Another 1995 poll indicated that 73 percent of former 
GDR citizens felt themselves unequal before the law.101 To be sure, such 
examples were part and parcel of a broader shift in East German public 
opinion during the 1990s, in which the initial hopes and expectations 
raised by reuniﬁcation eventually gave way to growing disillusionment
and retrenched East German identity. One oft-cited questionnaire, for 
instance, revealed that the percentage of polled East Germans who saw 
and identiﬁed themselves more as “Germans” than “citizens of the former
GDR” dramatically dropped from 66 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 
1995.102 
Still, it seems too simple and premature to judge these trials as hope-
less failures. The courts, after all, did hear 60,000 cases and managed to 
pass down over 1,000 indictments. No doubt much of the shortcomings 
derived from the very “limit to the Rechtsstaat’s capacity to repair the 
wrongs of a state that no longer existed.”103 Inevitably, perhaps, the ideal-
istic efforts to “master the East German past” were largely reduced to the 
eastward extension of the Rechtsstaat. As East German dissident Bärbel 
Bohley famously quipped, “We wanted justice, and we got the rule of law 
(Rechtsstaat).”104 But this seems to me not all that bad, given that the 
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chief objective of the trials was to expose the wrongdoings of the past and 
to put East German political life on a ﬁrm juridical footing. Doing so was
clearly a vast improvement on previous affairs in the GDR. Perhaps more 
than anything else, this signaled the full liberalization of Germany; for only 
liberal governments have pursued war crimes trials, and only they see trials 
as a proper way of dispensing justice. Liberal states, by deﬁnition, are legal-
ist, and believe in universal rights. And in a post-Nuremberg world, they 
are no longer put off by “geographical morality” and state sovereignty.105 
In this sense, the whole legal reckoning with the East German past—for 
better or worse—was very much in keeping with this liberal tradition. And 
as John Borneman has pointed out, the attempt—however imperfect—to 
prosecute former authorities has yielded remarkable political dividends in 
postcommunist eastern Europe more generally; for those countries that 
have seriously undertaken retributive justice have avoided the cycles of 
violence and counterviolence which have plagued those that did not.106 
This applied equally to the twentieth-century German experience, insofar 
as the failed efforts to mete out retributive justice after World War I only 
bred political violence and instability. Precisely the opposite occurred in 
1945, as justice—again, however imperfectly—helped forge the necessary 
connections between political accountability and legitimacy. Granted, the 
trials and the Enquete Commission’s “didactic public history” may not 
have brought about the cathartic healing that its South African counterpart 
apparently did; in fact, the East German version consciously avoided any 
“emotionalization,” and did not include real public participation. From 
this perspective, as Jennifer Yoder concludes, it may have “lacked public 
healing, leaving eastern Germans largely on the side-lines as their past was 
reconciled on their behalf.”107 Maybe it is true that the whole enterprise 
produced a good amount of light, but not much heat. But in contrast to 
the post-1949 period, “when democracy [in West and East Germany] had 
to be built on a shaky foundation of justice delayed—hence denied—and 
weakened memory,”108 the post-reuniﬁcation trials and public reckoning
have been quite novel and successful in this respect. Conducting affairs 
in this legalistic fashion has also assured that the emotional rhetoric of 
victimization (aggrieved nationalism, victor’s justice, etc.) that so animated 
German state crimes trials from the past Leipzig proceedings found little 
public forum. Not that the discourse of bruised honor and Western arro-
gance has disappeared; but if nothing else, the trials have at least held out 
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the promise of a new inter-German constitutional culture founded on a 
fusion of democracy, accountability and memory. 
How does this ﬁt into the more general post–Cold War tenor of
international justice? For one thing, the disappearance of Moscow as a 
polestar of a viable alternative to Western liberalism predictably fueled 
unbridled triumphalism of Western liberal ideology gone global. In part 
this is due to the fact that the US remains the only superpower, whose 
imperial might is now commonly described as a new and brash Pax Ameri-
cana. Such changes have prompted a whole academic cottage industry of 
late dedicated to rethinking the implications of this international “liberal 
revolution,” as Bruce Ackermann has called it.109 Of relevance here is 
that some have viewed these transformations as the surprise comeback of 
long-derided ideals from World War I. As one historian put it: 
Today, Wilsonianism is triumphant. Everywhere leaders pay obeisance 
to his vision. The principles he championed—democracy, collective 
security, self-determination—are extolled as the building blocks of 
a new world order (itself a Wilsonian construct). Wilson, having 
periodically been criticized as a dreamer or a failure, is once again 
hailed as a visionary whose ideals can light the way to a brighter 
future.110 
Even if Wilson’s idea of self-determination may have been put on ice 
during the Cold War, most notably in Eastern Europe, it returned with a 
vengeance in 1989. Nowhere was this more visible than in the dismantling 
of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of the Second World, as the map of 
Eastern Europe fractured into ever-smaller nation-states. Needless to say, 
the tragedy of Yugoslavia has shown that Wilson’s ideas were—and are—no 
sureﬁre recipe for regional stability and world peace. Despite that, Wilson
is credited with having ﬁnally defeated his ideological rival. As one New 
York Times reporter crowed in 1991: “From the Baltics to the Adriatic, 
from the Ukraine to the Balkans, oppressed millions have given new life to 
his imperative—and often troublesome principle [of self-determination]. 
Indeed, if results are the measure, Wilson has proved a more successful 
revolutionary than Lenin.”111 
By the same token, one could argue that post–Cold War interna-
tional politics have been fueled by the Nuremberg legacy. This is evident 
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with the expanded role of the UN in contemporary international affairs 
along with the globalized human rights politics accompanying the end 
of the Cold War. The creation of new judicial-type international institu-
tions (such as the 2002 International Criminal Court in The Hague) 
and various truth commissions across the globe from Argentina to South 
Africa underscore Nuremberg’s enduring global legacy.112 The early 1990s 
horrors of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs rallied the United Nations 
to intervene in the name of human rights abuses, representing the ﬁrst
time that the UN Charter was invoked to justify military engagement for 
this purpose.113 Some have welcomed such developments, arguing that 
human rights—and not Westphalian state sovereignty—have emerged as 
the basis of a new European order.114 Not everyone has been so bullish, 
though. Plenty of critics have expressed great misgivings about the ways 
in which human rights are used as a pretext for military intervention. For 
some skeptics, human rights are now becoming the new imperial ideol-
ogy of the twenty-ﬁrst century, replacing the older nineteenth-century
lexicon of “civilization” and “uplift” as rationales for political hegemony 
and military rule. German sociologist Ulrich Beck has gone so far as to say 
that Kosovo represents the dawning of a new era of “postnational war” 
based on “militaristic humanism,” in which war itself is “a continuation of 
human rights by other means.”115 So just as self-determination (as Walter 
Lippmann noted over ﬁfty years ago) has sometimes been exploited as a
“license to intervention and aggression,” human rights are in danger of 
serving as an alibi to advance old-style power politics.116 
The fallout of September 11 has exerted great impact on international 
justice as well. If nothing else, the Bush administration’s open ﬂouting
of international accords and organizations in the name of American self-
defense—whether in regard to the International Criminal Court, the 
United Nations, Guantánamo Bay or most recently Abu Ghraib—has seri-
ously challenged the logic and legacy of Versailles and Nuremberg. Here 
Bush appears to be following Truman’s dictum justifying his decision to 
intervene in Korea in 1950 that “if history has taught us anything, it is that 
aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the 
world.”117 On this score, Bush’s views thus far are more in keeping with 
the likes of Henry Cabot Lodge, the Massachusetts senator who emerged 
as Wilson’s most powerful opponent in the League of Nations debate in 
1919. At one point Cabot Lodge remarked “We are a great moral asset of 
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Christian civilization. How did we get there? By our own efforts. Nobody 
led us, nobody guided us, nobody controlled us … I would keep America 
as she has been—not isolated, not prevent her from joining other nations 
for … great purposes—but I wish her to be master of her own fate.”118 
Similarly, recent US policy is rightly described as a radical defense of state 
sovereignty and unilateralism at the expense of international mediating 
bodies and even its own liberal constitutional heritage. The increasing 
assault on civil liberties and the ever-expanding remit of government 
surveillance agencies both at home and abroad make this clear. 
The trampling of citizen rights and due process is of course nothing 
new, going as far back as the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798. More recently, 
such suspensions were quite common during World War II. One famous 
instance was FDR’s creation of a military tribunal (Proclamation 2561) 
to try eight Nazi saboteurs, two of whom were naturalized US citizens, 
for having planted explosives on the shores of Long Island in 1942. In 
this case, the leader suffered a crisis of conscience and eventually tipped 
off the FBI, whereupon the conspirators were quickly arrested; all but 
two were executed. Yet the legacy of the “Keystone Kommandos” is 
more than merely a forgotten story of Nazi espionage in the US.119 As 
one recent author has persuasively argued, it served as a key precedent 
for George W. Bush’s ordering of special military tribunals to try non-
US citizens suspected of engaging in or abetting terrorist attacks on the 
US.120 As such it marked a new concentration of power in the executive 
at the expense of legislative authority, whereby this special tribunal in 
effect created “new criminal offenses and new punishments.”121 The larger 
point, however, is that at precisely the moment when the London Charter 
and the inviolability of basic human rights were being expounded as the 
moral rationale for Allied warmaking, these civil rights and protections 
were being dishonored at home. It then exposed the Allied discrepancy 
between word and deed, making plain the extent to which human rights 
were—and still seem—“strictly for export.”122
GERMANY AND TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY JUSTICE
What is the relevance of this for Germany’s new role in twenty-ﬁrst-
century politics? For one thing, Germany has assumed a very different role 
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in international affairs in the wake of September 11, much to American 
consternation. Above all, it has led the charge against the use of military 
intervention in Iraq by insisting on peaceful solutions (in this case, 
continued weapons inspections) and defending the authority of the UN to 
mediate the international conﬂict. As is well known, this has caused a war of
words from both Berlin and Washington, giving rise to the greatest rift in 
American–German relations since World War II. For their part, American 
conservatives have not been shy in denouncing Germany’s antiwar stance 
as tantamount to betrayal and ingratitude toward its American partners 
for ﬁfty years of support and security.123 Other conservatives have taken a 
longer view of this growing cultural chasm between the United States and 
Europe. American commentator Robert Kagan, for example, has described 
these new differences as a kind of “clash of civilizations” in its own right, 
one that pits “Kantian” Europe against “Hobbesian” America.124 Certainly 
he is not wrong in pointing out diverging transatlantic attitudes toward 
the value of international organizations in delivering peace, justice and 
security. Particularly notable, however, is how Kagan’s formulation turns 
Wilson’s logic on its head. After all, it was Wilson the peacemaker who 
arrived in Europe with the dream of exorcising the demon of Hobbesian 
power politics from European affairs once and for all. The irony is that the 
players have apparently changed sides, as Europe—led by Germany—has 
emerged as the new defender of human rights, internationalism and 
collective security in the face of American unilateralism and vengeance 
politics. The upshot is that Germany has become the guardian of the legacy 
of Versailles and Nuremberg against the excesses of its original author. 
Needless to say, Germany’s newfound paciﬁsm has enormous con-
sequences for understanding the country’s new place in international 
politics. For even if Germany has been at the very center of discussions of 
international justice from 1919 to 1989, its status was mostly as its object. 
This understanding shaped Germany’s relationship with the US for most 
of the twentieth century, and it is this special relationship that has been 
called into question in 1989 and especially after 2001. For many (West) 
German observers, such a tack is foolish and worrisome, in that the suc-
cess story of post-1945 German liberalism was in many ways thanks to 
American support and security. This is not to say that suddenly Germany 
has turned its back on its American partners; it is rather that it is unafraid 
to criticize the US for abandoning its once-cherished international obliga-
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tions and moral principles.125 Some may dismiss this as merely Schroeder’s 
political opportunism and shrewd electioneering, a renewed and at times 
quite nasty form of German Schadenfreude about American (and Israeli) 
policy failures, or even perhaps the extension of Stresemann’s interwar 
politics to use the Allied language of justice to advance new national(ist) 
policies. Surely it is true that the German criticism of the US has been 
used to exercise national sovereignty and help give voice to a new Euro-
pean political future that is not necessarily coterminous with US policies. 
Yet it is also plausible to argue that Germany has in fact learned the les-
sons of Versailles and Nuremberg, and that its own national identity is in 
many ways shaped by a strong antiwar sentiment across the old Cold War 
divide. Perhaps it is high time to take seriously the comment made by 
General Lucius Clay, the military governor of Germany in 1945–49, when 
he asserted in an interview in the mid-1980s that the Nuremberg trials 
“were a very good thing, and that without them you would have a differ-
ent Germany today.”126 As German Culture Minister Michael Naumann, 
during a televised BBC roundtable in March 2002, pointedly retorted to 
suggestions that Germany’s antiwar politics was really a betrayal of trust, 
“why are our allies so bothered with German paciﬁsm? Isn’t that precisely
what they wanted from us in 1945?”
Naturally, such developments pose some difﬁculties for historians in
rewriting twentieth-century German history as a whole. In light of recent 
events, it seems worthwhile reconsidering the record of German antiwar 
sentiment, antimilitarism and peace politics, to say nothing of the history 
of Germans as “good Europeans.”127 How and to what extent ideas and 
practices of the Rechtsstaat, “constitutional patriotism” and European 
solidarity played out over the century deserve more sustained attention. 
The same goes for how changed notions of justice in the wake of Versailles 
and Nuremberg were expressed, remade or ignored in the German courts 
themselves. At stake, however, is more than simply adding these accounts 
to what we already know about German militarism, aggressive nationalism 
and wartime atrocities. There is the danger of simply rereading twentieth-
century German history through the prism of West German liberalism, 
thus fencing off the “other” history of violence, authoritarianism and 
unfreedom as the prehistory of peace and “normalization.” The pressing 
task is rather to rethink their relationship more carefully, to investigate 
how experiences and memories of both war and peace shaped the lives 
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of twentieth-century century Germans.128 This is particularly relevant 
to the post-Nazi period. For if it is true that the ethnic state makes war, 
and war makes the ethnic state, the destruction of the Third Reich and 
subsequent geopolitical division have forever scrambled these notions 
of German identity and selfhood. In other words, the long-maligned 
Nuremberg trials and their associated “reeducation” programs may have 
succeeded far more than commonly acknowledged. While justice was 
far from perfectly served in 1945–46, it did set in train the campaign to 
bring former leaders and criminals to book in each regime; this is why 
Jeffrey Herf maintains that the “Nuremberg interregnum” of 1945–49 
was the “golden age of postwar justice.”129 This is all the more compel-
ling, given that the trials did not nurture any Versailles-style “culture of 
defeat” based on mobilized passions of revenge and retribution toward 
the postwar orders. Perhaps its greatest tribute was the peaceful proceed-
ings of the Stasi trials in the 1990s, showing up the new political nation’s 
constitutional will to remember and atone. 
Notions of justice of course continue to inform contemporary 
German cultural politics. Evidence can be seen in the sharp cultural 
divide between “Ossis” and “Wessis,” as East Germans still very much 
feel themselves losers of the Wende and its promised prosperity for all. 
The regional electoral successes of East Germany’s reformed communist 
party, the Party of Democratic Socialists, or PDS, clearly play on the 
justice issue for many East German voters. No less striking has been the 
frank recollections of German suffering and hardship as a favorite site of 
post-reuniﬁcation memory-work and justice of late. While the refugees
issue has served as a perennial source of grievance, memory and cultural 
identity for decades, it has taken on surprisingly open expression in the 
last few years. One 1995 Spiegel opinion poll recorded that 36 percent 
of those asked answered yes to the question of whether they agreed that 
“the explusion of the Germans from the east [was] just as great a crime 
against humanity as the Holocaust [was] against the Jews.” As recently as 
1999 Chancellor Schroeder asserted that “every act of expulsion, however 
different its historical origins may be, is a crime against humanity.”130 
Similar rhetoric has also been noticeable in the wide publicity surround-
ing the 2002 publications of Günther Grass’s Im Krebsgang: Eine Novelle 
and especially Jörg Friedrich’s Der Brand, the latter of which has revived 
old claims of the Allied bombing campaign as crimes against humanity.131 
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The open reinvocation of war crimes phraseology to describe the Allied 
bombing and expulsions is quite disturbing for many, not least because 
it tends to blur the distinction between perpetrator and victim. Now, 
whether this “right to mourn” is a step toward or away from any genuine 
reckoning with the past is hard to gauge; perhaps even the idea of a full 
and cathartic Vergangenheitsbewältigung is itself a leftist holdover from an 
older Nuremberg logic that presumes a necessary linkage of knowledge 
and liberation. 
How all of this will turn out is of course anyone’s guess; but it is 
worth rethinking how Germany has shaped the language of war crimes 
and human rights over the century. And for the ﬁrst time since before
World War I, Germany is no longer the object and proving ground of 
international justice. On the contrary, it has become one of its principal 
subjects and champions. To what extent this is the strange victory of 
“victims’ justice”—with Germany standing as its main protagonist—
warrants consideration. Whatever the case, Germany is no longer the 
same place that it was, and older narratives of political sin and contrition 
may no longer apply as they once did. But one thing is certain: the history 
of twentieth-century international justice is inextricably tied to German 
crimes and punishments. How Germany moves beyond this legacy will 
surely be one of the hallmarks of its twenty-ﬁrst-century history, foreign
policy and identity politics. 
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